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Introduction
According to the mainstream among European economists and politicians the relation between unemployment, wages and collective bargaining seems to be rather simple. Persistent unemployment is -according to that view -the result of imperfections in the labour market caused by social institutions and regulations which prevent "market-clearing" wage levels and wage structures. Consequently, the responsibility for the persistently high unemployment in the European Union (EU) is given to so-called "structural" reasons which are mainly associated with a malfunctioning of labour market institutions such as collective bargaining, labour legislation and social security systems.
This view is currently highly influential among the EU-institutions and determines their policy recommendations in tackling the unemployment problem. The "Broad Economic Policy
Guidelines", for example, which have been regularly adopted by the European Council since the mid-1990s and could be seen as the most important EU document on economic policy, have called again and again for a policy of wage restraint and increasing wage differentials
(European Commission 2003a). The same requirements come from the European Central
Bank (ECB) which regularly demands structural reforms in the labour market and is permanently warning off trade unions for claiming wage increases which it considers too high. Considering this, it is no surprise that the major approach to fighting unemployment within the EU is the "European Employment Strategy (EES)" which focuses almost exclusively on labour market reforms.
Regarding wage policy and collective bargaining, the recommendations made by the various EU institutions could be summarised in three points. First, they call for a policy of wage restraint, i.e. as long as there is persistent unemployment real wage increases should be below productivity growth in order to strengthen the competitiveness and profitability of the firms.
Secondly, they demand a more differentiated wage structure which should reflect the different levels of productivity at regional and firm levels. Thereby, wage differentiation is often used as a euphemism for extending the low-wage sector. Finally, to adopt such a policy of wage restraint and wage differentiation a further decentralisation of collective bargaining is recommended.
The problem with this approach is that it is simply not convincing. Neither on the theoretical nor the empirical level can a strictly inverse relationship between the real wage rate and the level of unemployment be derived. Likewise there is also no strictly positive relationship between the degree of labour market regulation or the degree of wage bargaining co-ordination on the one hand and unemployment on the other hand. In the present paper we will therefore scrutinise the dominant view in the EU concerning labour market rigidity, wages and unemployment. We provide an alternative view which assumes that the level of employment is not determined in the labour market but by the overall level of economic activity in the goods market. Wages should therefore not only be considered as labour costs, but also play an important role for consumption demand and for the stabilisation of the price level in order to prevent both inflationary and deflationary tendencies. In our view, wages have no direct and immediate effect on unemployment. Unemployment has rather to be considered as a crucial determinant of wage developments, because the 'industrial reserve army' effect (Marx 1867: 762-801) systematically weakens the bargaining power of trade unions and threatens the established institutions of collective bargaining.
Consequently, structural reforms in the labour markets and decentralisation of wage bargaining will not be able to improve growth and employment in the EU but will weaken economic performance and contribute to the deterioration of the living conditions of a majority of people. In order to fight unemployment an alternative economic policy approach has to be pursued. This approach has to overcome the current neo-monetarist regime in which monetary policy is exclusively geared towards price stability, and fiscal policy is primarily committed to super-cyclical budget consolidation. Instead a growth and employment-oriented European coordination of macroeconomic policy is required, in which monetary and fiscal policies are responsible for growth and employment. Within such a framework wage policy would have to fulfil its macroeconomic task of stabilising both consumer demand and the overall price development. Such a macroeconomic-oriented wage policy requires a political re-strengthening of collective bargaining institutions which allows for a coordinated wage policy both at national levels and at the European level.
The present paper has the following structure. In Section 2 we discuss the theory behind the predominant view on unemployment and wages in the EU and show that it is not convincing and has therefore to be replaced by an alternative view. Section 3 deals with the empirics of the developments of wages and employment in the old EU (EU 15) as a whole and in France, Germany and the UK in particular and compares them to the US. Section 4 discusses the effects of mass unemployment on collective bargaining and the changing power relations between trade unions and employers which lead to new hegemonic arrangements of wage formation. In Section 5 we will draw some final conclusions for an alternative wage policy in Europe as part of a growth and employment oriented coordination of macroeconomic policy.
On the theory of wages and unemployment
The predominant view in the EU on wages and employment is theoretically based either on a simple neoclassical labour market view or on a more modern new-Keynesian concept of a Non-Accelerating-Inflation-Rate-of-Unemployment (NAIRU). 1 In the neoclassical labour market view, whenever there is involuntary unemployment it can be wiped out by means of reducing the real wage rate in the labour market. This requires, on the one hand, that nominal wage variations have no effect on the price level and therefore translate into real wage variations. On the other hand, this view requires that Say's Law holds, i.e. effective demand by households and firms in the goods market is always sufficient to take up the goods produced and supplied by firms.
In modern new-Keynesian theory this view is rejected because changes in nominal wage costs will affect prices when firms set their prices according to a mark-up on unit costs in imperfect goods markets. Also Say's Law cannot be assumed to hold in each case when prices are far from being perfectly flexible in the face of shifts of demand. As a result, in the newKeynesian models monetary and fiscal policies can affect employment in the short run, via the impact that these policies have on effective demand in the goods market. In the long run, however, unemployment is determined by the NAIRU which is itself dependent on structural factors of the labour market, the wage bargaining and the social security system. As such, the NAIRU describes the unemployment rate at which the distribution claims by employees and employers do not result in any increase or decrease in the inflation rate. Various newKeynesian models have been put forward to determine the NAIRU: wage bargaining models in which the wage rate and employment depend on bargaining powers of trade unions and employers, efficiency wage models in which the real wage rate exerts a positive impact on productivity (shirking or fairness models) or models in which the minimum real wage rate is determined by social benefits (Blanchard and Katz 1997) . When unemployment falls below the NAIRU in these models, inflation rises, and when unemployment climbs above the NAIRU the result is disinflation and deflation. employment falls below the NAIRU and inflation accelerates, but also as soon as unemployment climbs above the NAIRU and inflation decelerates. It is also assumed that such a symmetric central bank-reaction function will be effective, i.e. rising interest rates will always have a depressing effect on effective demand and hence on employment whereas falling interest rates always stimulate effective demand and employment.
According to the new-Keynesian view, in the long term, however, monetary policy has no influence on unemployment which is determined by structural supply side factors only.
Therefore, in order to reduce unemployment, the bargaining power of trade unions and employed 'insiders' has to be reduced. To achieve this, employment protection legislation has to be dismantled, the legal conditions for wage conflict and strikes have to be confined, and human capital as well as mobility of unemployed 'outsiders' have to be improved in order to increase effective competition in the labour market. Finally, wage bargaining decentralisation is supposed to allow for a higher degree of wage dispersion and the adjustment of wages to work place productivity. These measures are said to reduce upward wage pressure and to allow for higher employment at a constant inflation rate. Assuming a given production technology with decreasing returns, rising employment is accompanied by a lower (average) real wage rate and we once again get the inverse relationship between employment and the real wage rate which is quite familiar from the simple neoclassical labour market.
This new-Keynesian view, however, also suffers from some serious deficiencies. Structural But even if the central bank were to act in a more growth and employment friendly manner, the pursuit of a strategy aimed at reducing unemployment by deregulating the labour market, decentralising wage bargaining and enforcing nominal wage moderation on employees would entail a further risk. This kind of policy must not only rely on a symmetrical central bankreaction function as described above, but this policy also requires that monetary policy has a symmetrical effect which guarantees that unemployment determined by effective demand in the goods market adjusts to the NAIRU determined by structural factors in the labour market ). This, however, is very unlikely: In the short term, monetary policy may be able to choke a cumulative inflationary process caused by excessively low unemployment by means of applying the interest rate brake, thus curbing effective demand for goods and increasing unemployment. If however, during a recession, unemployment rises significantly above the NAIRU, leading to disinflation and ultimately deflation, then an interest rate cut may not be enough to stimulate an economic recovery, when firms have depressed profit expectations and are affected by debt deflation. Falling unit labour costs or even falling nominal wages will in this case exacerbate the recession and will not contribute to economic recovery.
This has already been made clear by Keynes (1936: 262-271 ) and also follows from modern post-Keynesian theories. 2 In this view the NAIRU can at best constitute a short-term employment barrier enforced by monetary policy, but it is not a long term equilibrium to which actual unemployment adjusts. In contrast to the new-Keynesian view, the post-Keynesian approach sees no reason to assume that the unemployment rate determined by effective demand in the commodity market will adjust to the NAIRU, which is determined by structural and supply-side factors (Sawyer 2001 (Sawyer , 2002 . On the contrary, it can be shown that in the long term the NAIRU adjusts endogenously to the actual unemployment rate ).
sive effect on investment and consumption is counteracted by the fact that in a modern credit money economy falling prices imply a redistribution of wealth from debtors to creditors with the associated risk of over-indebtedness. This debt deflation effect (Fisher 1933 ) serves to dampen investment and consumption if the realistic assumption is made that creditors are less inclined to spend than are debtors. Furthermore, it is more difficult to obtain credit to finance spending in a debt deflation scenario, since banks' and financial intermediaries' lending policy is determined by the creditworthiness of households and firms applying for loans, and their real indebtedness is an important indicator of how creditworthy they are.
If one realistically assumes the characteristics of a modern credit money economy as described in this post-Keynesian approach, it can thus be said that in times of recession, wage trends are the anchor to prevent deflationary processes, even if the monetary policy response also favours growth and employment. Organised labour markets, effective wage bargaining co-ordination and rigid nominal wages should therefore not be considered as obstacles to more employment and growth but rather as macroeconomic stabilisers and preconditions for a better macroeconomic performance. From this it also follows that instead of using the monetary policy instrument in case of inadequate wage developments, macroeconomic wage externalities can be internalised more effectively by taking a macroeconomic approach to coordinating wages policy. 4 In this approach nominal wage growth rates should be determined by the sum of long-term productivity growth for the economy as a whole and the central bank's inflation target. Nominal unit labour costs growth should therefore be equal to the target rate of inflation of the central bank. This firstly means that 'effective co-ordination' of wage bargaining is able to reduce inflationary pressures when employment is rising and in so doing to lower the employment limit expressed in the NAIRU. What is meant here by 'effective co-ordination' of wages policy is a functioning horizontal coordination between the sectors of industry which is accompanied by a functioning vertical co-ordination within the sectors (Traxler et. al. 2001 ), which solves the problem of implementation and prevents earnings drift and wage dumping.
Wages, prices and unemployment -a look at the data
In order to assess the relevance of the neoclassical or new-Keynesian view on wages and employment underlying the deregulationist labour market policies in the EU compared to the alternative post-Keynesian view, in the following paragraphs we will analyse the development of the unemployment rate, the inflation rate, the growth rates of nominal and real wages and the labour income share from 1960 until 2004 (Table 1 , see also the Figures in the appendix).
Our analysis focuses on the development in the old EU countries as a whole (EU 15), but we will also take a look at the developments in the largest EU countries -Germany, France and the UK-and compare them with the USA. Since the variables in question display marked cyclical fluctuations we will only make some statements about middle to long term trends when analysing the relationships between these variables.
Real wages and employment
For the neoclassical and new-Keynesian view to claim empirical relevance, we should observe a close long term relationship between real wage growth and the unemployment rate,
i.e. falling (rising) real wage growth should be associated with falling (rising) unemployment.
For the EU 15 this is definitely not the case: Periods of steeply rising unemployment rates in the mid 1970s, the first half of the 1980s and the early 1990s were associated with falling growth rates of real compensation per employee (Table 1 and Figure 1 ). And the reduction in unemployment since the mid 1990s has been accompanied by a slight increase in real wage growth. For the US we find a similar picture contradicting the neoclassical and newKeynesian claims: increasing unemployment from the late 1960s to the early 1980s was associated with a decrease in real wage growth, whereas the decrease in the unemployment rate since the mid 1990s has been accompanied by a slight tendency of increasing real wage growth (Table 1) . Only the US development from the mid 1980s to the early 1990s is in accordance with the neoclassical and the new-Keynesian view: we see a parallel development of unemployment and real wage growth. Taking a look at the developments in Germany, France and the UK our general conclusion is confirmed: there is no stable long rung term positive relationship between real wage growth and unemployment. On the contrary, in general we find an inverse relationship between the two variables, i.e. rising unemployment is associated with falling real wage growth, and there are only a few short periods in which the neoclassical and new-Keynesian assertion seems to hold, for example in the UK in the early 1990s or in
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Unemployment, nominal wages and labour income shares
Finally, we have to address the relation between unemployment, nominal wage growth and distribution. The new-Keynesian NAIRU-models as well as the post-Keynesian theories of wages and prices imply that rising (falling) unemployment should be associated with falling (rising) nominal wage growth, because unemployment is an important determinant of the trade unions' power to push through higher nominal wages. Indeed, for the EU 15 as a whole and for Germany, France and the UK in particular, we find that the fall in nominal wage growth from its peak in the mid 1970s until the mid 1980s had been associated with a continuous increase in the rate of unemployment (Table 1 and 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 4 1 9 6 6 1 9 6 8 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 4 Unemployment rate Annual growth rate of nominal compensation per employee: total economy
Nominal wage moderation and the associated dampening of nominal unit labour cost growth imposed by high unemployment is not completely passed on to prices by firms in each period in each country. Accordingly, unemployment may have major effects on functional income distribution ( Figure 4 , Table 1 ). In the EU 15 as a whole and in Germany and in France in particular, a rising tendency of unemployment rates since the mid 1970s has been accompanied by a tendency of the labour income share to fall since the early 1980s until the present. In the US, however, there seems to have been a tendency of the labour income share to fall since the early 1970s which is quite independent of the development of unemployment (Table 1) whereas the UK displayed a remarkable constancy in functional income distribution instead of a considerable increase in unemployment from the mid 1970s until the mid 1980s and a decrease since the mid 1990s. 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 4 1 9 6 6 1 9 6 8 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 that all these groups would have the same strong interest in diminishing unemployment. For "business leaders" a certain rate of unemployment has always been an important tool to safeguard "discipline in the factories" and to avoid the workers and their trade unions from becoming too strong. Therefore, "their class instinct tells them that lasting full employment is unsound from their point of view, and that unemployment is an integral part of the 'normal' capitalist system" (ibid.: 351). The NAIRU concept seems to give these class interests a modern expression and might also be read as the "non accruing indiscipline rate of unemployment" (Petit 1998 ).
High unemployment weakens the bargaining power of trade unions in at least three ways: In addition to that, in the 1990s many European countries were faced by the creation of new bargaining arrangements which explicitly aimed at a policy of wage restraint in order to increase competitiveness which became widely regarded as the decisive prerequisite for the 7 On the principle of solidaristic wage policy and theoretical foundations of trade union wage policies in Europe see Schulten (2004a Schulten ( , 2004b . To sum up, the persistently high level of unemployment in Europe has already led to a notable deregulation of labour market institutions. All these changes have contributed to a significant weakening of trade unions and to a transformation of collective bargaining which have become more and more dominated by the principle of "concession bargaining", whereby wage restraint and cuts in labour costs are regarded as the "magic formula" to create employment.
In practice, however, none of these institutional changes have led to a substantial reduction of 
Conclusion
At the Lisbon European Council in March 2000, the European Union set itself the goal to "regain the conditions for full employment" by 2010. In order to reach that goal the EU should "become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world" aiming at an average annual economic growth rate of 3%. Referring to the "European social model" the EU intends to combine "sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and Considering the poor economic developments in recent years, the EU seems to be further than ever away from achieving the Lisbon targets. Moreover, with the currently dominating economic policy approach as laid down in the "Broad Economic Policy Guidelines" and the "European Employment Strategy" the EU has no convincing strategy to overcome the problem of mass unemployment. 8 The EU policy recommendations made regarding wage policy and collective bargaining are particularly misleading because they have a strong deflationary bias and would contribute to further redistribution from labour to capital income. Instead of continuing with a policy of wage restraint as demanded by the EU, wage increases should be in line with average growth of productivity plus the inflation target set by the ECB. Such a growth and stability oriented wage policy would help to stabilise consumer demand and would give the ECB the opportunity for a more expansive monetary policy without a negative impact for price stability.
The EU demand for more wage differentiation is not convincing from an economic point of view and would further undermine the notion of the European social model which aims at "high-road development" combining high productivity and equality. Instead, the EU should think about strategies on how to contain the already existing low-wage sector in Europe, e.g.
by the introduction of a European minimum wage. 9 Besides this, the EU should not call for a further decentralisation of collective bargaining but for a re-strengthening of multi-employer 
